Type de contenu
Professeur invitéDmitri Nikulin
Conférences
Dmitri Nikulin de la New School for Social Research de New York (États-Unis), est invité par Barbara Carnevali et Emanuele Coccia au CRAL.
Conférences
Proclus on Evil
Dans le cadre du séminaire de Pierre Bouretz.
The problem of evil has become one of the central epistemological, moral, and political problems for contemporary philosophy. Yet, one of the most historically important discussions of evil appears in Neoplatonism, in particularly, in Proclus’ De malorum subsistentia, which is preserved in the Latin translation of William of Moerbeke and has been partly reconstructed from later Greek sources by Helmut Boese. In its obscure and indefinite nature, evil needs to be drastically rethought and requires a new and redefined philosophical vocabulary. The originality of Proclus’ approach becomes evident in his treatment of evil not as contrary or contradictory of the good but as its subcontrary. Proclus argues that evil can be caused by particular souls in an accidental way but that there is no final cause, or purpose, of evil. For this reason, in its ontological aspect, evil should be characterized as parypostasis, or “parasitic existence.” As such, evil as formlessness is itself not caused or intended. Rather, in its inescapable deficiency, radical evil is the privation and subcontrary of the good that exists parypostatically, that is, as elusively present in its absence as the misplacement of being and the displacement of the good.
Mardi 15 mars 2016, de 17h à 19h - EHESS (salle 5) - 105, boulevard Raspail 75006 Paris
Comic Mimesis
Dans le cadre du séminaire de Barbara Carnevali, L'observatoire des mœurs : littérature, éthique, sciences sociales
Until very recently, there has been relatively little interest in philosophy of comedy. Instead, modern philosophy has always been interested in tragedy and its significance for moral and political life. Yet, it is comedy that is paramount for understanding the very conditio humana. With reference to the works of Plato and Aristotle, as well as to the Tractatus Coislinianus, one can argue, first, that Menander’s New Comedy crucially differs from Aristophanes’ Old Comedy, both in its plot structure and presentation of characters; and, second, that New Comedy could only develop against the background of the then contemporary philosophy, which it incorporated into its dramatic action. New Comedy then flourishes in the works of Plautus and especially Terence, and becomes distinct in modern comedy that refines and the genre and makes it aesthetically and philosophically important, particularly, in the works of Shakespeare, Molière and Woody Allen. Contrary to sixteenth century “Italian theory” that held New Comedy in high esteem as the source of aesthetic and philosophical ideas, thinkers of the Romantic age framed their aesthetic theories in terms of a “quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns.” Besides, the understanding of the modern subject as tragic, solitary, and being toward death makes tragedy, rather than comedy, philosophically attractive, which is clearly seen in August Schlegel’s Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature and in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and Aesthetics. Both dismiss the importance of the comic mimesis and value tragedy over comedy, Old Comedy over New Comedy, and Greek drama over Roman drama.
Mercredi 30 mars 2016, de 15h à 18h - EHESS (salle 5) - 105, boulevard Raspail 75006 Paris
The Comedy of Philosophy
Dans le cadre du séminaire de Barbara Carnevali, L'observatoire des mœurs : littérature, éthique, sciences sociales
The philosophical significance of comedy lies in that philosophy itself can be considered as essentially a comic enterprise. Comedy can be understood not so much from the perpetuation of laughter or jokes, but rather from the structure of its plot as isomorphic with that of the philosophical argument. Both the comic plot and philosophical argument move from an initial complication, through a rather complex development in a number of steps, toward a resolution of the initial problem or conflict. Besides, comedy’s moral implications are exemplified in reasoning and actions of its main character, represented in New Comedy by the figure of the slave, servant, or maid, who is both clever and foolish. In comedy, it is the fool who is wise and the philosopher, often without knowing it. Through a series of deliberate actions, which resemble the steps of reasoning in a philosophical argument, the dispossessed rescues others from the impasse of an apparently irresolvable situation. The deprived is thus the mastermind behind the development of the comic plot and the “director” of the intrigue who plans and stages a whole new dramatic frame in order to trick the seemingly wise and steer the action. Such a character, represented by the figures of Aesop, Socrates and Diogenes, becomes the dramatic representation of the thinker or philosopher on stage who helps to propel the “argument” of the plot toward well-being. In this way, freedom and the good ending do not come about as a result of fate or a deus ex machina, but are reached through reasoned action in which no one appears as an isolated subject. On the contrary, every character is integrated into the dialogical comic action.
Mercredi 6 avril 2016, de 15h à 18h - EHESS (salle 5) - 105, boulevard Raspail 75006 Paris
Critique of Bored Reason
Dans le cadre du séminaire de Barbara Carnevali, L'observatoire des mœurs : littérature, éthique, sciences sociales
The critique of bored reason is the critique of the modern Cartesian and Kantian subject, which is constructed as isolated and tragic, as one and unique, autonomous, and (overly) reflexive. The “inwardness,” then, is the distinctive mark of the subject that sets it apart from everything that is not the subject, characterized by the “outwardness,” which turns out to be the world as mere extension. The Aristotelian subject as the ontological, logical, grammatical and rhetoricalsubiectum or hypokeimenon becomes the direct object of the cognition, construction and invention of the modern subject. As such, modern subject is lonely and alone, solitary and inescapably monological, that is, it can neither escape nor get rid of itself and its own company, which is exclusive of the other. For this reason, the modern subject is inevitably bored. Boredom, then, is the modern condition of human existence. It is very significant that the concept of, and the term for, “boredom” is utterly missing in ancient Greek language and appears only later, with the advent of the modern developed subjectivity. The topic of boredom will be discussed with reference to Kant’s Anthropology and Kracauer short piece on Langeweile published in 1924 in the Frankfurter Zeitung.
Mercredi 13 avril 2016, de 15h à 18h - EHESS (salle 5) - 105, boulevard Raspail 75006 Paris
Conférences
Proclus on Evil
Dans le cadre du séminaire de Pierre Bouretz.
The problem of evil has become one of the central epistemological, moral, and political problems for contemporary philosophy. Yet, one of the most historically important discussions of evil appears in Neoplatonism, in particularly, in Proclus’ De malorum subsistentia, which is preserved in the Latin translation of William of Moerbeke and has been partly reconstructed from later Greek sources by Helmut Boese. In its obscure and indefinite nature, evil needs to be drastically rethought and requires a new and redefined philosophical vocabulary. The originality of Proclus’ approach becomes evident in his treatment of evil not as contrary or contradictory of the good but as its subcontrary. Proclus argues that evil can be caused by particular souls in an accidental way but that there is no final cause, or purpose, of evil. For this reason, in its ontological aspect, evil should be characterized as parypostasis, or “parasitic existence.” As such, evil as formlessness is itself not caused or intended. Rather, in its inescapable deficiency, radical evil is the privation and subcontrary of the good that exists parypostatically, that is, as elusively present in its absence as the misplacement of being and the displacement of the good.
Mardi 15 mars 2016, de 17h à 19h - EHESS (salle 5) - 105, boulevard Raspail 75006 Paris
Comic Mimesis
Dans le cadre du séminaire de Barbara Carnevali, L'observatoire des mœurs : littérature, éthique, sciences sociales
Until very recently, there has been relatively little interest in philosophy of comedy. Instead, modern philosophy has always been interested in tragedy and its significance for moral and political life. Yet, it is comedy that is paramount for understanding the very conditio humana. With reference to the works of Plato and Aristotle, as well as to the Tractatus Coislinianus, one can argue, first, that Menander’s New Comedy crucially differs from Aristophanes’ Old Comedy, both in its plot structure and presentation of characters; and, second, that New Comedy could only develop against the background of the then contemporary philosophy, which it incorporated into its dramatic action. New Comedy then flourishes in the works of Plautus and especially Terence, and becomes distinct in modern comedy that refines and the genre and makes it aesthetically and philosophically important, particularly, in the works of Shakespeare, Molière and Woody Allen. Contrary to sixteenth century “Italian theory” that held New Comedy in high esteem as the source of aesthetic and philosophical ideas, thinkers of the Romantic age framed their aesthetic theories in terms of a “quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns.” Besides, the understanding of the modern subject as tragic, solitary, and being toward death makes tragedy, rather than comedy, philosophically attractive, which is clearly seen in August Schlegel’s Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature and in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and Aesthetics. Both dismiss the importance of the comic mimesis and value tragedy over comedy, Old Comedy over New Comedy, and Greek drama over Roman drama.
Mercredi 30 mars 2016, de 15h à 18h - EHESS (salle 5) - 105, boulevard Raspail 75006 Paris
The Comedy of Philosophy
Dans le cadre du séminaire de Barbara Carnevali, L'observatoire des mœurs : littérature, éthique, sciences sociales
The philosophical significance of comedy lies in that philosophy itself can be considered as essentially a comic enterprise. Comedy can be understood not so much from the perpetuation of laughter or jokes, but rather from the structure of its plot as isomorphic with that of the philosophical argument. Both the comic plot and philosophical argument move from an initial complication, through a rather complex development in a number of steps, toward a resolution of the initial problem or conflict. Besides, comedy’s moral implications are exemplified in reasoning and actions of its main character, represented in New Comedy by the figure of the slave, servant, or maid, who is both clever and foolish. In comedy, it is the fool who is wise and the philosopher, often without knowing it. Through a series of deliberate actions, which resemble the steps of reasoning in a philosophical argument, the dispossessed rescues others from the impasse of an apparently irresolvable situation. The deprived is thus the mastermind behind the development of the comic plot and the “director” of the intrigue who plans and stages a whole new dramatic frame in order to trick the seemingly wise and steer the action. Such a character, represented by the figures of Aesop, Socrates and Diogenes, becomes the dramatic representation of the thinker or philosopher on stage who helps to propel the “argument” of the plot toward well-being. In this way, freedom and the good ending do not come about as a result of fate or a deus ex machina, but are reached through reasoned action in which no one appears as an isolated subject. On the contrary, every character is integrated into the dialogical comic action.
Mercredi 6 avril 2016, de 15h à 18h - EHESS (salle 5) - 105, boulevard Raspail 75006 Paris
Critique of Bored Reason
Dans le cadre du séminaire de Barbara Carnevali, L'observatoire des mœurs : littérature, éthique, sciences sociales
The critique of bored reason is the critique of the modern Cartesian and Kantian subject, which is constructed as isolated and tragic, as one and unique, autonomous, and (overly) reflexive. The “inwardness,” then, is the distinctive mark of the subject that sets it apart from everything that is not the subject, characterized by the “outwardness,” which turns out to be the world as mere extension. The Aristotelian subject as the ontological, logical, grammatical and rhetoricalsubiectum or hypokeimenon becomes the direct object of the cognition, construction and invention of the modern subject. As such, modern subject is lonely and alone, solitary and inescapably monological, that is, it can neither escape nor get rid of itself and its own company, which is exclusive of the other. For this reason, the modern subject is inevitably bored. Boredom, then, is the modern condition of human existence. It is very significant that the concept of, and the term for, “boredom” is utterly missing in ancient Greek language and appears only later, with the advent of the modern developed subjectivity. The topic of boredom will be discussed with reference to Kant’s Anthropology and Kracauer short piece on Langeweile published in 1924 in the Frankfurter Zeitung.
Mercredi 13 avril 2016, de 15h à 18h - EHESS (salle 5) - 105, boulevard Raspail 75006 Paris